Reconceptualizing human rights by Arvan, Marcus
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1636008
1 
 
Reconceptualizing Human Rights 
Marcus Arvan 
University of Tampa 
 
Abstract: This paper defends several highly revisionary theses about human rights.  §1 
shows that the phrase ―human rights‖ refers to two distinct types of moral claims.  §§2-3 
argue that several longstanding problems in human rights theory and practice can be 
solved if, and only if, the concept of a ―human right‖ is replaced by two more exact 
concepts: 
International human rights: moral claims sufficient to warrant coercive domestic 
and international social protection. 
Domestic human rights: moral claims sufficient to warrant coercive domestic 
social protection but only non-coercive international action. 
§3 then argues that because coercion is central to both types of human right, and coercion 
is a matter of justice, the traditional view of human rights – that they are normative 
entitlements prior to and independent of substantive theories of justice – is incorrect.  
Human rights must instead be seen as emerging from substantive theories of domestic 
and international justice.  Finally, §4 uses this reconceptualization to show that only a 
few very minimal claims about international human rights are presently warranted.  
Because international human rights are rights of international justice, but theorists of 
international justice disagree widely about the demands of international justice, much 
more research on international justice is needed – and much greater agreement about 
international justice should be reached – before anything more than a very minimal list of 
international human rights can be justified. 
 
This paper defends several highly revisionary theses about human rights.  §1 shows that 
the phrase ―human rights‖ refers to two distinct types of moral claims: 
(A) Moral claims sufficient to warrant coercive domestic and international social 
protection, 
(B) Moral claims sufficient to warrant coercive domestic social protection but 
only non-coercive international protection. 
§§2-3 then argue that several longstanding problems in human rights theory and practice 
– e.g., concerns about the determinacy of the concept of a human right, skepticism that 
some or all ―human rights‖ are not even rights, but rather (culturally imperialist) goals or 
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aspirations, etc. – can be resolved if and only if the concept of a ―human right‖ is 
replaced by the following two more specific concepts: 
International human rights: moral claims sufficient to warrant coercive domestic 
and international social protection. 
Domestic human rights: moral claims sufficient to warrant coercive domestic 
social protection but only non-coercive international action. 
§3 then argues that because coercion is central to both types of human right, and the 
justification of coercion is a matter of justice, the traditional view of human rights as 
normative entitlements existing prior to and independently of substantive theories of 
justice is incorrect.  Human rights must instead be seen as emerging from theories of 
justice, with domestic human rights emerging from a theory of domestic justice and 
international human rights emerging from a theory of international justice.  Finally, §4 
shows that the central normative question about international human rights – namely, 
which international human rights actually exist – is mostly unsettled.  I show that 
theorists of international justice agree that a few fundamental human interests (e.g. 
freedom from genocide, torture, etc.) warrant coercive international protection, there is 
still widespread disagreement over whether a broader array of domestic rights (e.g. rights 
to freedom of speech, democracy, etc.) also warrant coercive international enforcement.  I 
conclude that much more work on international justice must be done, and greater 
theoretical agreement reached, before anything more than a few minimal claims about 
international human rights can be justified.   
 Three caveats are necessary before we begin.  First, in distinguishing between 
domestic and international human rights in §§2-3, I make assertions about which sorts of 
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moral claims are ―plausibly‖ examples of each.  For instance, I shall use the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights‘ assertion of a human right to equal pay for equal work 
(Article 23) as a ―plausible example‖ of a domestic human right (one warranting coercive 
domestic protections) that may not be an international human right (one warranting 
coercive international protections).  It is crucial to note that I use these examples only to 
illustrate the conceptual difference between domestic and international human rights. I 
ultimately argue (in §4) that precisely which human rights are domestic and which ones 
are international is mostly an open question — one to be resolved by theories of justice.  
 Second, although I hold that both domestic and international human rights warrant 
domestic or international coercive enforcement, respectively, I do not assume either that 
(a) all rights warrant coercive enforcement, or (b) all human rights must be feasible to 
enforce.  There are good reasons not to make either of these assumptions.  First, it is 
unclear that all rights warrant coercive enforcement   For example, it seems plausible that 
people have an interpersonal moral right not to be lied to (since we generally believe that 
people are morally entitled to be told the truth), but that it would be wrong to coercively 
enforce this right.  Human rights, however, are not ordinary interpersonal rights: they are 
moral-political rights – rights that governments have a moral responsibility to promote 
and protect.
1
  Because governments have a moral responsibility to promote and protect 
human rights, and governments are essentially coercive entities, all human rights do 
involve some notion of warranted coercion.  Next, consider whether something can be a 
human right only if it is feasible to enforce.  Although a few theorists do defend such a 
                                                        
1 Just about all human rights theorists accept this, for reasons Beitz (2009) explains on p. 109.  Only a 
few theorists (e.g. Simmons 2001) hold that human rights are “natural” rights having no essential 
relation to coercive political enforcement. 
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view
2
, most theorists reject the notion that human rights must be feasible to enforce
3
, and 
for good reason.  The idea that human rights must be enforceable is profoundly 
implausible.  Consider the human right to be free from slavery.  It seems clear that this 
was always a human right, even it was ever feasible to enforce.  Indeed, it is necessary to 
regard it this way in order to explain the injustice of slavery.  We say that slavery was 
unjust because, although people always had a right to be free from slavery, the right sadly 
went unenforced for far too long, and (at least in the US) a bloody Civil War had to be 
fought for it to become feasible to enforce.  On my analysis, domestic and international 
human rights are not necessarily characterized by the feasibility of their enforcement.  
Rather, they are moral claims that ought to be enforced if and when it becomes feasible.
4
 
  Finally, I will not defend any clear or substantive definition of coercion in this 
paper.  Since the correct definition of coercion is deeply contentious (and I cannot resolve 
the debate about its nature here
5
), I will not assume any specific theory of coercion but 
instead work with paradigm cases.  For example, I will assume the paradigm case of 
coercive domestic protections to be the construction and enforcement of civil laws by 
police and military (i.e. ―law and order‖).  In the international case, I will take coercion to 
include war, military action short of war, punitive political and economic sanctions 
(including embargoes), and finally, genuine and credible threats of any of the above.  As 
we will see in §4, I consider it to be a central question of a theory of international justice 
(and by extension, a theory of international human rights) to determine which types of 
                                                        
2 See e.g. Geuss (2001). 
3 See e.g. Beitz (2009), Buchanan (2004), Griffin (2007), Nickel (2007), Miller (2007), Raz (2007). 
4 Notice that this is consistent with something being a human right even if it never becomes feasible 
to implement.  This is straightforwardly intuitive: even if liberating slaves never became a realistic 
possibility, most of us would still say that slaves had a right to freedom (we would simply say that 
enforcing the right is sadly impossible). 
5 See the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry, “Coercion”, for an introduction to this debate. 
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international coercion are warranted in response to which types of human abuses (or 
threats of human abuses). 
 
§1. Human Rights as Two Very Different Sorts of Moral Claims  
Existing theories of human rights fall broadly into two categories: those that understand 
human rights as moral claims sufficient to warrant coercive international protection
6
, and 
those that understand human rights as moral claims sufficient to warrant international 
concern ranging from international coercion (e.g. punitive sanctions, military force) to 
non-coercive international pressure (e.g., criticism, assistance, cooperation).
7
  Let us call 
the first of these views the International Juridical View and the second the International 
Concern View.   
The International Juridical View is widely rejected today, and for good reason.  
Generally speaking, the canonical criticism of the International Juridical View is that 
many purely domestic rights (rights that do not justify coercive international 
enforcement) deserve to be called ―human rights.‖8  As James Griffin argues, 
The point of human rights, on the almost universally accepted conception of them, 
is far wider…For example, they quite obviously have a point intra-nationally: to 
justify rebellion, to establish a case for peaceful reform, to curb an autocratic 
ruler, to criticize a majority‘s treatment of racial or ethnic minorities.  And they 
are used by the United Nations and by non-governmental agencies to criticize 
institutions within a single society.  Many hospitals are condemned for denying 
                                                        
6
 See e.g., Buchanan (2004): 118; and Rawls (1999): 79-80.  Also see Shue (1996): 13, 31, although Shue‘s 
concern is with ―basic‖ rights, not ―human rights.‖ 
7
 See Beitz (2009): 106-125; Griffin (2007): 101-103; Ignatieff (2001): 22; Miller (2007): 46-8, 185-194; 
and Nickel (2007): 101. 
8
 See Beitz (2009): 106-125, 141-159; Caney (2005): 78-85; Griffin (2007): 23-7; Nickel (2007): 98-102; 
and Raz (2007): §§2, 4.  
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patients really informed consent.  And some parents can reasonably be criticized 
for violating their mature children‘s autonomy and liberty.9 
This criticism of the International Juridical View has, I believe, two distinct parts.  First, 
the International Juridical View seems morally inadequate.  Because the language of 
human rights is morally useful on a purely domestic level – it enables people to voice and 
fight more effectively for certain domestic social protections, even in cases where 
international coercion is unwarranted – there are compelling moral reasons to reject the 
International Juridical View.  Second, the International Juridical View seems 
semantically inadequate.  From a literal perspective, the phrase ―human rights‖ means 
―the rights of all human beings‖, or perhaps ―the rights that all human beings have 
‗simply in virtue of being human‘.‖10  But if this is the correct semantic analysis, then 
purely domestic rights (those that do not warrant international coercion) are human 
rights.  For whatever purely domestic rights there are, all people seem to share them.
11
  If 
all human beings have a purely domestic right to freedom of speech, then literally 
speaking, that is a human right.  If all human beings have a purely domestic right to a fair 
trial, then that too is a human right.  Thus, the International Juridical View appears to be 
both morally and semantically inadequate.  
The International Concern View – a view that is gaining greater currency12 – 
avoids these problems by identifying ―human rights‖ with, 
i. Moral claims sufficient to warrant coercive domestic social protection, which, 
                                                        
9
 Griffin (2007): 24. 
10
 See Caney (2005): 64; Gewirth (1986): 41; Griffin (2007): 2; Miller (2007): 178; Nickel (2007): 37-8; 
and Simmons (2001): 185. 
11
 See e.g., Buchanan (2004): esp. ch. 1 and 142-7; Cohen (2006): 226-48; and Rawls (1999) esp. 78-80. 
12
 The International Concern View is defended by Beitz (2009); Griffin (2007); Nickel (2007); and many 
others. 
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ii. In some cases warrant coercive international social protection, but 
iii. In other cases warrant only non-coercive international action.13   
As we see here, ―human rights‖ ultimately divide into two types of moral claims, 
(A) Moral claims sufficient to warrant coercive domestic and international social 
protection, 
and, 
(B) Moral claims sufficient to warrant coercive domestic protection but only non-
coercive international action. 
By understanding ―human rights‖ as having this broader moral and semantic scope, the 
International Concern View accounts for precisely what the International Juridical View 
wrongly omits: the dual international/domestic nature of human rights discourse.  It 
supports the idea that human rights are always moral claims that people have reason to 
fight for domestic social protections of, as well as the idea that human rights are in some 
cases moral claims for which people have reason to fight for coercive international social 
protection.  It is thus not surprising that the International Concern View has attained such 
popularity. 
 
§2. The Case for Reconceptualizing Human Rights 
We have seen that the International Concern View of human rights is semantically and 
morally superior to the International Juridical View, and that the International Concern 
View applies the concept of a ―human right‖ to two very different moral claims: 
(A) Moral claims sufficient to warrant coercive domestic and international social 
protection, 
                                                        
13
 Again, see Beitz (2009): 106-125; Griffin (2007): 101-103; Ignatieff (2001): 22; Miller (2007): 46-8, 
185-194; and Nickel (2007): 101. 
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and, 
(B) Moral claims sufficient to warrant coercive domestic protection but only non-
coercive international action. 
Some may believe that once this is recognized, we should continue to use the concept of 
a ―human right‖ as we always have, as long as we are careful to publicly and theoretically 
distinguish between the two different sorts of moral claims the language refers to.  
However, there are compelling practical reasons to supplant the concept of a ―human 
right‖ with the following, more precise concepts: 
International human rights: moral claims sufficient to warrant coercive domestic 
and international social protection. 
 
Domestic human rights: moral claims sufficient to warrant coercive domestic 
social protection but only non-coercive international action. 
For, as we will now see, the failure to explicitly distinguish domestic from international 
human rights is responsible for four of the most serious and widely discussed problems 
surrounding human rights theory and discourse. 
Let us begin with two well-known worries about human rights.  First, there is a 
remarkable amount of disagreement among theorists over the concept of human rights 
(i.e. what they are ―for‖), their justification, and finally, their substance (i.e. which things 
actually are human rights).  As Beitz writes, 
[A]lthough the idea and language of human rights have become increasingly 
prominent in public discourse, it has not become any more clear what kinds of 
objects human rights are supposed to be, why we should believe that people have 
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them, or what follows from this belief for political practice…[This is] a problem 
for anyone inclined to believe that our political ideas should have some clear and 
distinct significance in our thinking about how to act.  This is especially so when 
the ideas play such a central role in framing public concerns of great 
importance.
14
 
And, as Griffin writes, 
In what state is the discourse of human rights today?...The term ‗human right‘ is 
nearly criterionless.  There are unusually few criteria for determining when the 
term is used correctly and when incorrectly – and not just among politicians, but 
among philosophers, political theories, and jurisprudents as well.  The language of 
human rights has, in this way, become debased.
15
 
Here are just a few examples of how profoundly theorists disagree about the concept and 
substance of human rights. Some theorists believe there are many human rights
16
; others 
very few.
17
  Many theorists see human rights as ―minimal standards‖18; others deny that 
they are necessarily minimal standards.
19
  Some theorists take human rights to be 
protections ―necessary for a minimally decent life‖20; others take them to be protections 
necessary for agency
21
; others understand them as protections of personhood
22
; others as 
protections of ―urgent‖ human interests23; others as protections of ―central human 
                                                        
14
 Beitz (2009): xi-xii. 
15
 Griffin (2007): 14-5. 
16
 See Beitz (2009), Nickel (2007). 
17
 See Miller (2007), Rawls (1999). 
18
 See Buchanan (2004), Ignatieff (2007), Nickel (2007), Miller (2007), and Rawls (1999). 
19
 See Beitz (2009) and Raz (2007). 
20
 See Buchanan (2004), Nickel (2007), and Miller (2007). 
21
 See Gewirth (1986). 
22
 See Griffin (2007). 
23
 See Beitz (2007). 
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capabilities‖24; others as ―fundamental‖ human interests25;  and others still as simply 
rights of international justice.
26
   
 The second notable feature of human rights theory and discourse is the prevalence 
of skepticism about human rights.  For example, Charles Beitz begins his recent book, 
The Idea of Human Rights, by cataloguing an array of skeptical worries.
27
 Human rights 
theory and practice have been repeatedly criticized as categorizing mere moral goals or 
aspirations as ―human rights.‖28  Oftentimes this objection is accompanied by a charge of 
moral or cultural imperialism, the typical claim being that many ―human rights‖ are 
simply parochial Western goals.
29
   
The source of these problems — both the skepticism and profound substantive 
and conceptual disagreements — can be traced to the failure to explicitly distinguish 
domestic and international human rights.  First, let us ask ourselves why there are so 
many different criteria for human rights.  The reason for the enormous amount of 
disagreement is only clear once domestic and international human rights have been 
explicitly differentiated.  Consider the fundamental difference between the two types of 
rights.  International human rights seem to call out for one kind of justification.  
Intuitively, international coercion is a very serious matter – most of us tend to think that 
coercing other nations requires a very strong moral justification. Therefore, we can 
concluded that international human rights plausibly are ―minimal standards.‖  After all, if 
international coercion is ever completely justified (more on this in §4), it is justified to 
                                                        
24
 See Sen (1999) and (1985); Nussbaum (2000) and (1992): 202-46. 
25
 See Rawls (1999). 
26 See Caney (2005). 
27
 Beitz (2009): 3-12 gives a nice overview.  See e.g., Cranston (1973): ch. 8; Holcombe (1948); and Geuss 
(2001): 144. 
28
 See e.g. Beitz‘s (2009) discussion of the worry that some human rights are mere ―manifesto‖ rights (pp. 
117-121).  Also see Feinberg (1973): 67, 95; O'Neill (2000): 97-8, 101-5; and O'Neill (2005): 428, 430. 
29
 See Beitz (2009): 4-7 and Ignatieff (2007): 58-77 for an overview of these worries.   
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protect people against the very worst sorts of abuses – abuses that threaten individuals‘ 
most urgent, fundamental interests necessary for living a minimally decent life (e.g., 
genocide or famine).  Domestic human rights, on the other hand – rights that plausibly 
warrant domestic coercive protection but only non-coercive international promotion (a 
good example is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights‘ assertion of a human right 
to equal pay for equal work) – call for a very different kind of justification.  Because 
domestic human rights only warrant coercive domestic protections, they seem not to be 
protections of a minimally decent life but protections of something else: human agency, 
perhaps (or more plausibly, as we will see in §4), domestic justice.  
My reconceptualization of human rights thus explains the immense amount of 
disagreement about human rights.  The disagreement is due largely to the fact that  
theorists have failed to recognize ―human rights‖ as two kinds of very different things in 
need of two very different kinds of justification.  My reconceptualization also shows the 
path of resolution for these disagreements.  For as I discuss in §§3-4, once we have 
explicitly distinguished domestic and international human rights, the respective 
justifications they require are clear: domestic human rights will be specified by the 
correct theory of domestic justice, and international human rights will be specified by the 
correct theory of international justice. 
My reconceptualization of human rights also accounts for, explains, and (to a 
certain extent) justifies skeptical concerns about human rights.  Let us begin with the the 
worry that many so-called ―human rights‖ seem to be mere moral goals or aspirations.  It 
is hard not to share this skeptical given the strange, incoherent sounding things human 
12 
 
rights theorists often say about ―human rights.‖  For example, James Nickel asserts that 
human rights are ―minimal‖ international standards,30 but then says the following: 
[Human rights] serve as standards for noncoercive persuasion.  They say to 
countries: ―Here are the standards for good government that the world community 
endorses.  Consider adopting them!‖  Second, [human rights] serve as standards 
for domestic aspiration and criticism, as rights to enact and implement 
nationally.
31
 
These claims seem incoherent.  How can human rights be ―minimal‖ international 
standards – or even rights, for that matter – if they are mere standards for aspiration that 
governments should ―consider adopting‖?  Intuitively, goals are things to consider 
adopting.  Rights are supposed to be mandatory. 
 Now consider some similarly strange things that Beitz asserts about human rights.  
Beitz simultaneously claims that (a) human rights are not necessarily minimal 
standards,
32
 (b) all human rights are protections of ―urgent‖ human interests,33 (c) many 
human rights only warrant non-coercive international action
34
, and (d) some human rights 
only specify general political goals.
35
  Again, this sounds incoherent.  How can human 
rights be protections of truly urgent human interests but only state political goals 
sufficient to warrant non-coercive international action?  If a right is not important enough 
to warrant international enforcement, can the interests it protects said to be ―urgent‖?   
Finally, even Beitz seems to recognize how odd his claims are.  He not only concedes 
                                                        
30
 Nickel (2007): 36-7. 
31
 Ibid: 101; italics added. 
32 See Beitz (2007): 29-30. 
33 Ibid: 109-110. 
34 Ibid: 109,  
35 Ibid: 30. 
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that, ―it is unclear…whether the objects called ―human rights‖ within this practice [and 
his model] are in any familiar sense rights‖36; he also states that, ―human rights on [my] 
model…are less rigorous than ordinary rights.‖37   
 Finally, consider David Miller‘s statements about human rights.  Like Nickel, 
Miller claims that human rights are minimal international standards, and protections of a 
minimally decent life.
38
  However, just like Nickel and Beitz, Miller then lapses into the 
language of aspiration.  He writes, ―The purpose of human rights is not simply to guide 
the behavior of those who have to deal directly with people.  They can also be used to set 
targets for governments, international organizations, etc.‖39  Again, it seems bizarre to 
describe rights as ―targets‖; that term sounds more characteristic of goals.  Rights are 
intuitively more than mere targets — they are mandatory. 
It is no wonder that so many people are skeptical about human rights.  Human 
rights theorists often talk about human rights as though they are more like moral goals 
than bona fide rights.  My reconceptualization not only explains why human rights 
theorists say such strange things; it also reveals that there is some truth to the skeptics‘ 
worries.  As we have seen, domestic and international human rights are two very different 
things.  International human rights plausibly are minimal international standards, in that 
they are important enough to justify coercive international enforcement.  Domestic 
human rights, on the other hand, are not plausibly minimal international standards.  They 
are genuine domestic rights, but at the international level – insofar as they do not warrant 
coercive enforcement – they can also be called international moral goals.  My 
                                                        
36 Beitz (2009): 2. 
37
 Ibid: 119.  
38 Miller (2007): ch. 7. 
39 Ibid: 193. 
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reconceptualization demonstrates that domestic human rights are simultaneously bona 
fide rights (domestically) but also mere moral goals (internationally).  This explains why 
human rights theorists say such incoherent-sounding things.  The overly broad concept of 
a ―human right‖ cannot coherently conceptualize the sense in which domestic human 
rights are genuine (domestic) rights but also mere international moral goals.  We can only 
become clear on this feature of domestic human rights when we explicitly distinguish 
them from international human rights. 
Accordingly, my reconceptualization also reveals that skeptics have had a valid 
complaint about human rights assertions.  Domestic human rights are genuine domestic 
rights.  However, internationally, they are better described as (international) moral goals.  
Moreover, they are also plausibly imperialist moral goals.  For whereas international 
human rights – those that warrant coercive international protection (such as the right to 
security of the person and freedom from torture) – generally enjoy wide (though by no 
means universal
40
) cross-cultural agreement, many domestic human rights do not enjoy 
wide cross-cultural agreement. Most moral and political theorists in the West today 
believe that the correct theory of domestic rights is liberal in nature. Purely domestic 
human rights, therefore, really are distinctly ―Western‖: they embody a Western, liberal 
conception of justice.
41
 
My reconceptualization of human rights also reveals that a longstanding ―debate‖ 
about human rights is in a certain sense a pseudo-debate (though, as we will see in §4, 
this debate can be recast in a more coherent way).  Let us examine the debate over 
                                                        
40 It is not hard, for example, to find cultures that deny the right to life to women.  
41 It is, of course, a further question whether a liberal theory of justice is objectionably parochial.  
Liberals, obviously, maintain that it is not, and that illiberal conceptions of justice are unjustified.  We 
cannot settle this matter here. 
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whether human rights are ―minimal‖ international standards.  International human rights, 
those that are serious enough to warrant coercive international protection, surely are 
minimal standards because they are important enough to trigger international 
enforcement.  Domestic human rights, on the other hand, are not plausibly minimal 
international standards for the simple reason that they‘re just not important enough to 
warrant coercive international protection.  The entire philosophical debate over whether 
human rights are ―minimal‖ standards is, therefore, a red-herring.  Some human rights are 
minimal standards, others are not – and we need distinct theories of each. 
Finally, it is only when we reconceptualize human rights that we are in a position 
to see how truly impoverished existing theories of human rights are in terms of action-
guidance.  Because existing theories of human rights lump domestic and international 
human rights together under a single heading (calling them both ―human rights‖), human 
rights theorists have all but ignored many of most important normative questions 
separating the two.  How, for example, are we to draw the line between human rights 
urgent enough to warrant coercive international action and those not urgent enough to do 
so?  I do not know of a single theory of human rights that gives a clear answer to this 
question.   
To illustrate, consider a small (but representative) example of what human rights 
theorists have said about coercion and military action on behalf of human rights.  In his 
entire book on human rights, Beitz only mentions coercive international force on a single 
page, stating that coercion and military force are ―dramatic‖ and ―exceptional‖ means for 
enforcing human rights. He does not provide any clear analysis of which human rights 
warrant coercive international enforcement (not to mention military force), when, or 
16 
 
why.
42
  Beitz‘s analysis, in other words, is that human rights are something like rights to 
the following disjunction: they are rights to international criticism or assistance or 
sanctions or military force.  The obvious problem is that this analysis is not very helpful 
or action-guiding.  A good theory of X should not merely tell us that X is either a 
requirement to A or a requirement to B or a requirement to C.  A good theory of X should 
tell us which X’s are requirements to A, which X’s are requirements to B, and so on.  By 
lumping domestic and international human rights together, Beitz‘s account of human 
rights fails to answer the most important normative/moral questions about human rights: 
what various human rights require in terms of international force, coercion, non-coercion, 
etc. 
Beitz is far from alone in this regard.  With only one exception – Simon Caney, 
who argues (implausibly
43
) that coercive intervention and force are justified by human 
rights whenever those actions can be expected to successfully protect human rights – 
literally all of the human rights theorists I have mentioned in this paper make, at most, 
extremely broad pronouncements about when and why international force and coercion 
are justified.  For example, Rawls devotes a paltry two paragraphs in The Law of Peoples 
to the relationship between human rights and international coercion and force, broadly 
stating that respect for human rights is sufficient to exclude coercion or, in ―grave‖ cases, 
military force (fair enough – but when is their violation sufficient to warrant coercion and 
                                                        
42
 Beitz (2009): 39. 
43
 Caney‘s (2005): 233-5 argument is implausible because he never gives a moral justification of the costs 
that interventions ought to impose upon various parties for the sake of human rights.  Although Caney‘s 
claim that political institutions are legitimate only when they respect human rights is plausible, without a 
detailed analysis of the costs that can be justly imposed upon people for the sake of realizing legitimate 
conditions, Caney lacks a clear moral justification for the kinds of very real costs (e.g. people die in 
military intervention) that coercion and military force involve. 
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force?).
44
  Similarly, Allen Buchanan states that ―armed intervention may be needed as an 
ultimate sanction for the [human rights] principles I have proposed‖, without providing 
much insight into when or why human rights might warrant such extreme international 
action.
45
   
The same is also true of James Nickel who, in his book-length treatment of human 
rights, devotes a scant two sentences to the question of when human rights warrant 
international coercion and force.  Nickel writes, ―Because enforcement efforts are costly 
and dangerous it is reasonable to restrict their use to the most severe human rights cases.  
These tend to be situations in which large numbers of people are being killed.‖46  Or 
consider Ignatieff, who asserts that, ―where a state fails in its elementary obligations – 
maintaining physical security and an adequate food supply for its population – or where 
its army and police are engaged in sustained violence against minority or dissident 
political groups, it may temporarily forfeit its rights of sovereign immunity within the 
international system.‖47  Then there is David Miller, who is even more silent on the 
matter: his entire book on global justice contains no analysis or justification of 
international coercion and force, including the chapter on human rights.
48
   
Finally, in his book on human rights, James Griffin purports to show how his 
theory of human rights coheres with international law and practice. However, he ignores 
the fact that two primary human rights covenants – the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Social, Economic and 
                                                        
44
 Rawls (1999): 79-80. 
45
 Buchanan (2004): 442-3. 
46
 Nickel (2007): 101. 
47
 Ignatieff (2007): 38. 
48
 Indeed, the only mention of force or coercion in Miller‘s book (2007) occurs on pp. 92-3, in the context 
of a highly hypothetical case of a bank robber. 
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Cultural Rights (ICESCR) – treat their respective ―human rights‖ in two completely 
different ways.
49
  On the one hand, the ICCPR is governed by the First Optional Protocol 
– which, although it does not explicitly state any policies for coercive enforcement, is 
increasingly understood in practice as implying a Responsibility to Protect through 
coercive force in grave cases.
50
  The ICESCR, on the other hand, explicitly affirms [in 
Article 1] the right of nations to determine their own social, economic, and cultural 
status, asserting additionally [in Article 2] that the social, economic and cultural rights it 
lists are to be promoted, ―progressively…through international assistance and 
cooperation.‖51  Insofar as Griffin only applies his theory of human rights to international 
law and practice at an extremely broad level, never giving an account of why only some 
human rights warrant international coercion and force, Griffin, like the other theorists 
discussed, has failed to give a clear analysis of exactly what human rights are. Once 
again, we are missing the answer to a crucial question: why do only some human rights 
warrant coercion and force, and when?   
To be fair, Griffin often mentions ―practicalities,‖ holding that the responsibilities 
associated with different human rights depend in part on what is practical.
52
  One might 
think that it is possible to distinguish between domestic and international human rights – 
and that Griffin has an account of the differences between the rights in the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR – in terms of what is practical to internationally enforce (e.g. the ICCPR rights) 
and what is not (the ICESCR rights).  As we will soon see in §§3-4, however, 
                                                        
49
 See Griffin (2007): chapter 11. 
50
 I thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing this to my attention. 
51 An anonymous reviewer has asked whether I understand these human rights instruments as a 
basic way of distinguishing between domestic and international human rights.  The answer is no.  
Although I believe the ICCPR and ICESCR provide a plausible map of the distinction, according to my 
reconceptualization of human rights, the question of whether they divide rights up correctly can only 
be decided by the correct theories of domestic and international justice. 
52 Griffin (2007): 37-39, 44, 192, 235. 
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practicalities alone are deficient in settling these issues.  The question of which rights 
ought to be the subject of coercive domestic protections and which rights ought to be the 
subject of coercive international protections are fundamentally matters of domestic and 
international justice – and while justice plausibly includes practicalities (i.e. justice 
should be practical), it is more than merely practical: it is a normative matter of what 
people are owed.  Thus, insofar as Griffin aims to account for human rights and the 
differences between the ICCPR and the ICESCR merely in terms of practicalities, his 
account is deeply impoverished.  Again, I discuss this more in §§3-4. 
Perhaps the most distressing thing about the fact that human rights theorists say so 
little about whether (and to what extent) human rights are rights to international force and 
coercion, is that they typically give inadequate justifications for the little they do say.  
Why, one might ask, should international coercion be restricted to particularly ―grave‖ 
cases of human rights violations?  Literally none of the leading human rights theorists 
discussed in this paper give clear or convincing answers.  We have already seen (see 
footnote 43) how Caney‘s attempt to justify force and coercion is implausible.  He 
entirely ignores moral questions about the costs that force and coercion impose upon 
people for the sake of human rights.   Next, recall Nickel‘s pronouncement that coercion 
and force are usually warranted only when large numbers of people are killed bcause 
―enforcement efforts are costly and dangerous.‖  Military force is certainly dangerous and 
costly – but how dangerous and costly are political or economic sanctions?  In many 
cases, particularly when imposed by powerful states on less-powerful states, the costs and 
dangers of sanctions are likely to be lower than military force.
53
 Thus Nickel‘s claims 
                                                        
53 Though, of course, this is not always the case.  It is important to note that in order for sanctions to have 
lower costs than military force, countries imposing sanctions should closely monitor their effects on the 
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about when human rights violations warrant international coercion or force are not only 
far too broad – when it comes to certain types of coercion (e.g. sanctions by powerful 
states on non-powerful states), the grounds he gives for restricting coercion only to grave 
cases are simply unconvincing.  If this is right – if human rights theorists have generally 
neither stated nor justified when or why human rights warrant international coercion or 
force, as opposed to mere ―concern‖ (e.g. international criticism) – we can concede that 
these theorists have also not told us, with any clear justification, what exactly various 
human rights are rights to.  Assuming that freedom of religion is a human right, is it a 
right to international coercive enforcement, military force, non-coercive criticism, or 
something else?  Again, we are given no clear answers.  
It is natural to ask why human rights theorists have so ignored these issues.
54
  
Although one can only speculate, my reconceptualization of human rights provides a very 
plausible answer.  As we will see in more detail shortly, most human rights theorists have 
adopted what I like to call the ―Basic View‖ of human rights – a view according to which 
human rights are normatively more basic than the normative demands of complete 
theories of domestic and international justice.  Because force and coercion impose costs 
on people, and how costs should be distributed among people is a matter of justice, the 
Basic View is inherently incapable of providing a detailed analysis exactly when or why 
international force and coercion are morally justified.  Human rights theorists have 
largely ignored the issues of international force and coercion because their approach to 
human rights precludes it. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
population enduring them. The goal of sanctions should be to weaken a human-rights violating 
government, and should aim to avoid dire hardship among its people 
54 I again thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing this question. 
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As we will see in more detail in §§3-4, human rights theorists never provide clear 
answers to questions about international force and coercion because, again, they have 
been giving the wrong of type of theory.  It is only when we reconceptualize human 
rights into the two classes I propose that it becomes clear that there can be no such thing 
as a single theory of human rights (of the type that is so common today).  In order to 
account for domestic and international human rights, each type of right and the specific 
coercive protections they require need to be provided by (A) a complete theory of 
domestic justice, and (B) a complete theory of international justice. 
Some readers of this paper have responded
55
 that I ask too much of human rights.  
Why should human rights tell us precisely who has an obligation to provide the things 
they are rights to, at what cost, in what circumstances, etc.?  Why not think that human 
rights are simply basic, or ―core‖, normative claims about ―goods‖ that all people are 
entitled to?  Some could argue, for example, that the human right to freedom from torture 
is nothing more than a right not to be tortured by anyone.  Why should we suppose that 
the human right not to be tortured must also include claims about who has obligations to 
protect people from torture (e.g. the UN?), under what circumstances, etc.?   
 I have two things to say in response to this worry.  First, the worry itself illustrates 
how inert (i.e. less than adequately action-guiding) human rights are if we understand 
them in the way suggested.  Consider, for example, the human right to be free from 
torture.  If saying this is a human right tells us nothing more than that people should not 
be tortured, then it tells us nothing about who should do what (and at what cost) to 
actually protect people against torture.  What we really want to know – and what a theory 
of human rights should tell us – is what sorts of protections human rights require (i.e. 
                                                        
55
 Once again, I thank Bas van der Vossen and two anonymous reviewers for raising this issue. 
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coercive international protections?, military force?, etc.).  The problem, in other words, is 
not that I ask too much of a theory of human rights.  The real problem is that human 
rights theorists have been asking far too little.  It is only once we see that there are two 
fundamentally different types of human rights – and that theories of domestic and 
international justice are necessary for specifying each type of human right – that it 
becomes evident that an adequate theory of human rights will be action-guiding in all of 
the ways that existing theories of human rights are not.  After all, adequate theories of 
domestic and international justice presumably should specify which types of domestic 
and international coercive protections are required by justice, when, and why (as these 
are precisely the sorts of questions that theories of justice aim to answer). 
 Finally, the claim that human rights are basic normative claims – claims stating 
nothing more than entitlements to certain goods (e.g. not to be tortured by anyone) – 
contradicts both ordinary and philosophical language.  It makes perfect sense, for 
example, to ask if the human right to freedom from torture is a right to international 
coercive intervention.  The proponent of this ―Basic View‖ of human rights – the person 
who thinks the human right to freedom from torture is nothing more than a right not to be 
tortured by anyone – has to say that this is an ill-formed question (that the human right to 
freedom from torture itself is nothing more than a right not to be tortured by anyone, and 
thus, that questions of enforcement are external to the content of the right).  Yet what 
justifies the Basic View?  What if, as I expect, any adequate theory of international 
justice says that the international community has an obligation to use coercive force to 
prevent torture within individual states?  It would seem perfectly intuitive to say that the 
human right to be free from torture is a right to international intervention held by every 
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tortured person, or any person threatened with torture.  The Basic View, however, must 
deny this.  The Basic View must say that the obligation to intervene is something external 
to the right, not part of it.  This claim, however, seems utterly arbitrary – particularly if 
we understand rights in the usual philosophical sense (as comprised by Hohfeldian 
incidents – i.e. powers, immunities, etc.56).  For suppose every human being did have a 
moral entitlement to international intervention in the case of torture (or threat of torture).  
Why shouldn‘t we say that this is part of the human right to be free from torture?  It is 
both (a) something the person has a right to (qua Hohfeldian incidents), and (b) it pertains 
to the person not being tortured.  The Basic View of human rights, then – the one that 
says that we need not answer questions about precisely who has what obligations in order 
to give an adequate theory of human rights – runs up against not only ordinary language 
but also against philosophical language (i.e. the language of Hohfeldian incidents).  As 
such, I submit that despite its great popularity, we lack sufficient reason to accept the 
―basic‖ interpretation. 
 
§3. Domestic and International Human Rights as Rights of Domestic and 
International Justice 
Almost all of the human rights theorists I have discussed here, with the exception of 
Caney and Rawls (though even Rawls takes human rights to be ―basic‖ normative 
requirements of international justice), have sought to understand human rights 
independently of a well-developed theory of international justice (i.e. in terms of ―urgent‖ 
human interests, as protections of a ―minimally decent human life‖, etc.).  We can now 
see that this is a mistake.  Both types of moral claims that ―human rights‖ refers to – 
                                                        
56
 See the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry entitled, ―Rights‖, §2 for an introductory discussion. 
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moral claims to coercive domestic social protections (domestic human rights), and moral 
claims to coercive international protections (international human rights) – involve claims 
about coercion.  Coercion is the sort of thing of which we can (and should) always ask, 
―Is it just?‖  On the one hand, one can ask ―When does justice require, permit, or forbid 
domestic coercion?‖  On the other hand, one can also ask, ―When does justice require, 
permit, or forbid international coercion?‖  Because domestic and international human 
rights are both moral claims regarding the use of coercion at two different social levels, 
one simply cannot give a clear and adequate analysis of human rights independently of 
well-developed theories of domestic and international justice, respectively.  Andrew 
Clapham is right: human rights just are rights of justice.
57
 
 Some readers might maintain that we can give a moral justification for 
international coercion (a theory of international human rights) without a theory of 
international justice, by reference to (e.g.) the notion of a ―minimally decent human life.‖  
After all, didn‘t I state earlier that if anything can morally justify international coercion, a 
universal right to a minimally decent human life can? There are, however, two problems 
with taking the idea of a minimally decent life to be a sufficient justification of 
international human rights.  First, the concept of a minimally decent life seems essentially 
contestable.  Who decides what constitutes a minimally decent life?
58
  People from 
different cultures are apt to give very different answers.  People in Western cultures, for 
example, will probably define a minimally decent life in terms they view as universal: for 
                                                        
57
Clapham (2007): 162.  
58 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing this point.  This further supports my argument that 
the idea of a “minimally decent life” is insufficient to provide an adequate analysis of justified 
international coercion. 
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example, individual human capabilities, or human needs
59
, etc.
60
  Many people in Islamic 
cultures, however, might a minimally decent life very differently (e.g. as conformity with 
the Koran), as might people in Eastern Asian cultures (e.g. conformity to the greater 
social good and traditions).
61
  Second, even if it is possible to provide a universally 
acceptable definition of a minimally decent life, we lack any account of whether justice 
requires the international community to coercively enforce more than protections of a 
minimally decent life without a theory of international justice.  This is Caney‘s point 
when he says that once we recognize certain domestic human rights – for example, a 
domestic right to equal pay for equal work
62
, which is not obviously necessary for a 
minimally decent life
63
 – it is hard to see why global justice doesn‘t permit using 
international coercion to protect all of those rights, both domestic and international.
64
  
After all, if something is a domestic right, why shouldn‘t it also be coercively enforced 
internationally (as an international right)?  Only a substantive theory of international 
justice can answer this question.  Thus, there is no way around my main argument: one 
simply cannot give an appropriate account of international human rights prior to or 
independently of a substantive theory of justice.   
 
§4. Where Domestic and International Human Rights Stand Now, and How to Move 
Forward 
My reconceptualization of human rights provides relatively clear answers about which 
sorts of domestic human rights people have.  While there is still considerable 
                                                        
59 See Nussbaum (1992, 2000) and Sen (1985). 
60 See Miller (2007): 179-181. 
61 See Ignatieff (2007) for an extended discussion. 
62 I do not mean to assert that this is a domestic human right; I mention it as a possible example 
(whether it is a domestic right depends on the correct theory of domestic justice). 
63 And again, who defines a “minimally decent life”? 
64
 Caney (2005): 232-3. 
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disagreement about domestic justice, there is also quite a lot of agreement (at least among 
Western liberal theorists).  For example, it is widely agreed that domestic justice requires 
things like freedom of speech, freedom of religion, an equal right to vote in elections, etc.  
I argue that all of these requirements of domestic justice are domestic human rights.  
 International human rights, on the other hand, are a very different story.  Theorists 
of international justice only agree on a few basics – for example, that the worst sorts of 
human suffering and abuse (e.g. genocide, ethnic cleansing, etc.) are sufficient to warrant 
coercive international action.  Beyond this, however, there is very little agreement about 
when (and to what extent) international coercion, including military force, is justified.  
Indeed, as a general matter, theories of international justice are still very much in their 
infancy.  Substantive theories of global and international justice have only begun to 
emerge in the last several years, and there is a great deal of disagreement about a number 
of fundamental issues – particularly the question of whether, and to what extent, unjust 
regimes should be conceived as having an international right to self-determination.  Some 
theorists of international justice – for example, Rawls, Miller, and Reidy – argue that 
international justice assigns a great deal of self-determination to certain types of nations, 
and that international coercion is only warranted to protect against the worst types of 
abuses.
65
  In contrast, a number of other theorists contend that international justice denies 
much self-determination to nations, and that coercive international institutions are 
warranted to enforce domestic equal liberal rights (e.g. freedom of speech, etc.) all 
around the world.
66
   
                                                        
65 See Rawls (1999), Miller (2007), and Reidy (2004) 
66 See e.g. Caney (2005), Kuper (2004), and Moellendorf (2002). 
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 So what can we presently say, with justification, about international human 
rights?  The answer is: very little.  Because there is a great deal of agreement that 
international coercion is warranted to protect people against a few very severe types of 
abuse or neglect (genocide, ethnic cleansing, etc.), we can comfortably assert that people 
have international human rights to be protected against these severe abuses.  In other 
words, we can confidently assert the traditional international Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P).  However, because there is very little agreement beyond this, much more work on 
international justice is required, and more agreement reached among theorists, before we 
can reasonably assert anything more than the minimal aforementioned list of international 
human rights.  
Some readers might be tempted to respond that because violations of the most 
―minimal‖ international human rights almost always begin as violations of less minimal 
rights (e.g. suppression of the right to vote or associate freely), a much more extensive 
array of international human rights is justified as protections against violations of the 
minimal ones.
67
  For example, Nickel provides ―linkage arguments‖ that purport to derive 
an array of human rights from a few basic ones.
68
  And indeed, such linkage arguments 
are broadly consistent with the new ―Human Security Doctrine‖ (HSD), which advocates 
broad (though underspecified) international protections of human security (including 
protections against domestic violence, unemployment, starvation, and lack of health 
care). 
My reply is that the new Human Security Doctrine and Nickel-type linkage 
arguments can only be adequately evaluated with much further theoretical work on (and 
                                                        
67 I thank an anonymous referee for encouraging me to discuss this doctrine. 
68 See e.g. Nickel (2007): 129-131 and 144-146. 
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greater consensus about) international justice.  Let me explain.  Even if violations of a 
broader array of rights (e.g. to employment, health care, freedom of speech) is found to 
preempt violations of the most important international human rights — and this is a 
difficult argument to prove empirically (as many nations have extensively violated lesser 
rights for a very long time without lapsing into genocide or ethnic cleansing) – it is still 
not clear whether something like the new Human Security Doctrine is morally justified as 
a doctrine of international human rights.  There are two reasons for this.  First, it may be 
possible to adequately protect a wider range of rights – i.e., those ―lesser rights‖ 
 included in the Human Security Doctrine – while only treating them as domestic rights: 
rights that the international community should promote but not necessarily coercively 
enforce.  Again, this is a difficult empirical question to answer.  Second, whether a broad 
array of rights should be treated as international human rights depends on the outcome of 
theoretical debates about national self-determination.  After all, even if violations of 
lesser rights have a certain tendency to lead to violations of the most important rights 
(e.g. rights against genocide), many theorists of international justice still argue that each 
nation has a right to national self-determination, free of coercive international 
interference, until the most egregious violations begin to occur.
69
  For both of these 
reasons, I conclude that it is presently unclear whether the new Doctrine of Human 
Security and assertions of more extensive lists of international human rights are 
warranted. Until theorists of international justice arrive at a greater consensus in 
answering these questions, we can only confidently assert the traditional Responsibility to 
Protect the most minimal international human rights. 
 
                                                        
69 See e.g. Miller (2007) and Rawls (1999). 
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Conclusion 
The theory and practice of human rights have been subject to an extraordinary amount of 
disagreement, skepticism, and confusion, and existing theories of human rights have all 
but ignored the most important normative questions about human rights.  We have seen 
why these things have occurred.  Human rights theorists have long supposed that human 
rights have a certain kind of nature when, in reality, they are two fundamentally different 
types of things: domestic human rights, which only warrant domestic coercive protection, 
and international human rights, which warrant both domestic and international coercive 
protection.  Finally, we have seen that because coercion is always a matter of justice, 
substantive theories of domestic and international justice are necessary for specifying 
each type of right. Thus, human rights theory must dramatically change course.  Most 
human rights theories today understand human rights as being more basic than justice. 
As we have seen, such theories cannot tell us with sufficient clarity what human rights 
are exactly rights to.  Finally, we have seen that because there is very little agreement 
among theorists of international justice on the justification of international coercion 
above and beyond the protection of a few ―minimal‖ international rights, we are presently 
only justified in asserting a very minimal list of international human rights.  Much more 
work needs to be done on international justice – and much more agreement reached 
among theorists – before we can confidently state whether more international human 
rights exists than the ―minimal‖ ones, and before we can state, with any precision, what 
sorts of international coercion (e.g. military action, sanctions, etc.) international human 
rights require, when, and why. 
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